In Defense of Direct Perception Essay -- Philosophy Philosophical Essa

In Defense of Direct PerceptionABSTRACT My goal in this paper is to defend the exact that one can directly perceive an aspiration without possessing both descriptive effects about this object. My strategy in defending this claim is to rebut three arguments that beleaguer my view of direct perception. According to these arguments, the belief of direct perception as I construe it is objectionable since (1) it is epistemically worthless since it leaves perceived objects uninterpreted (2) it cannot explain how perceived objects atomic number 18 identified and (3) it is ill-prepared to assign objective content to perceptual states. What is involved in the claim that one directly perceives an object? The notion of direct perception that I propose to defend in this paper is this that one directly perceives an object if ones perception of this object is not mediated by beliefs. Put another way, a direct observer does not believe anything about an object in (directly) perceiving it. On this construal of the notion of direct perception, it follows that if one directly perceives an object, one does not describe this object for any description of an object is expressed as a belief, and direct perceptions do not involve beliefs. The direct perceiver, I claim, does not (and indeed may be completely unable to) give a description of the perceived object, without this lack (or inability) detracting from the fact that the object is directly perceived.In defending this view of direct perception, we requisite to become clearer on how it is possible for a belief to mediate ones perception of an object. There are (at least) two ways in which this can occur. Heres the first.A belief can be said to mediate ones perception of an object if a belief se... ...ld, itself, be an interpretationbut then weve simply displaced the problem one step, for the question will arise again with this interpretation, to wit, what is its object. Nor could the object of an interpretation simply be what satisfies the interpretation (or, put another way, whatever satisfies the descriptive beliefs associated with a perception) for an object could satisfy this interpretation, without being the de facto object of perception. Indeed, an object of indirect perception might not, in actuality, even satisfy ones associated descriptive beliefsand still it will be indirectly perceived. Thus, the object of an indirect perception must be what is provided by a direct perceptionwhat other object could be a candidate? That is, the notion of an indirect perception relies on a prior notion of a direct perception, and is indeed inconceivable without it.